Amazon has rolled out a new privacy feature for its Ring cameras called Throw Away the Key Encryption, or TAKE, promising to limit how much footage the company can see. But according to an analysis from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the update to Ring camera encryption falls well short of the protections users might expect, leaving several openings for law enforcement and the company itself to access supposedly private video.
Summary
Key takeaways
- Amazon introduced Throw Away the Key Encryption (TAKE), a new key-management system for Ring cameras.
- Ring holds encryption keys in its cloud for 24 hours to power features like video search and smart alerts, then deletes them unless the user requests old footage.
- Account recovery keys are stored on the camera itself by default, a setup the EFF says could be exploited if a device is seized.
- Ring says it keeps no backups of keys and has no employee access to raw footage, but video descriptions remain available to the company.
- Law enforcement could still, in theory, compel Ring to retain or hand over keys or unencrypted content because of how the system is built.
Amazon launches Throw Away the Key Encryption for Ring cameras
TAKE is Amazon‘s attempt to close a long-standing privacy gap: under the old default setup, Ring always had access to customer footage in order to run features like motion alerts or video search. The new system changes that by giving the user’s device its own key, while Ring only holds a temporary copy in its cloud infrastructure.
How TAKE manages encryption keys
Under this scheme, Ring’s servers receive a copy of the key just long enough to process footage for features the company says it can’t otherwise offer, including smart alerts, video descriptions, and video search. Once that processing window closes, Ring deletes the key from its servers.
Improvements over previous encryption methods
Compared with Ring’s earlier defaults, this is a real step forward, since it at least puts some limits on how long historical footage stays exposed. But the EFF is blunt about the ceiling on that improvement: TAKE is “not even close to the privacy protections of end-to-end encryption,” according to the organization’s assessment.
TAKE’s functionality and privacy implications
The core trade-off with TAKE is that Ring still needs to see unencrypted footage, at least briefly, to make its smart features work — meaning the privacy gain is really about limiting the duration of exposure, not eliminating it.
Temporary access to unencrypted video for cloud processing
To decrypt footage for those features, Ring’s cloud gets access to stored video for a window of 24 hours. The company has added secure-enclave measures meant to make the underlying key material harder to export directly, but the keys themselves are still released to services that can be modified. Once cloud processing finishes delivering the requested feature, the key disappears from Ring’s servers — at least until the next request triggers the whole cycle again.
User control over key deletion and footage access
That cyclical design is where things get murky. Every time a user wants to watch older footage or use a “smart” feature, the keys get sent right back to the server. In practice, the EFF argues, that makes the system barely different from standard encryption-at-rest, where the server holds the keys whenever they’re needed — with the user’s own device effectively standing in for a hardware security module.
Security limitations and risks in TAKE encryption
Ring maintains it keeps no backups of encryption keys and that no employee can access raw footage. Those are meaningful claims, but they come with caveats that matter for anyone weighing Ring privacy features against genuine end-to-end protection.
Storage of account recovery keys on devices
Account recovery keys are stored directly on the camera by default. Combined with the fact that indices of video content remain accessible to Ring, that arrangement means TAKE offers no real defense against mass surveillance. A search could sweep across cameras for specific terms, followed by physical seizure of a targeted device, decryption of its account backups, and ultimately decryption of the video itself.
Access to video descriptions by Ring
Even when raw footage stays out of reach, features like “Video Search” and “Smart Video Descriptions” mean written summaries of what’s happening on camera are readily available to the company. Ring told EFF that “as Ring continues to expand and further strengthen TAKE’s protections, video descriptions will be included.”
Potential exploitation if devices are seized
This is one of the sharpest limitations the EFF flags: because recovery keys live on the hardware itself, anyone who physically obtains a camera — including law enforcement acting on a seizure — could potentially unlock backed-up account data and, from there, decrypt stored video.
Law enforcement access and regulatory concerns
Because of how key rotation and cloud access are built into TAKE, it remains technically possible for Ring to alter its current practice if a court or agency compels it to. This is one of the central questions around law enforcement access Ring customers should understand before assuming their footage is fully private.
Possibility to compel Ring to retain or provide keys
The EFF notes that Ring could receive a legal order demanding it preserve content encryption keys or save unencrypted video from memory to disk — meaning the company would retain some level of access even under TAKE’s design. In a statement to EFF, Ring said: “By design, under TAKE, Ring will not be able to provide encryption keys or decrypted content. With TAKE, Ring will only preserve and provide encrypted video files in response to valid legal process. It has been and continues to be Ring’s policy to object to overbroad legal requests.” The EFF specifically pressed Ring on whether it could be ordered to modify its existing practice to turn over or preserve unencrypted video — something that appears technically feasible — but the company did not directly address that scenario.
TAKE’s inability to prevent mass surveillance
Why this matters: a system that can technically be reconfigured under legal pressure isn’t the same as one where the provider simply has no keys to hand over. That distinction is at the heart of why privacy advocates consider TAKE an incremental fix rather than a structural solution.
Contrast with end-to-end encryption’s stronger privacy
True end-to-end encryption removes the company from the equation entirely — Ring would never hold the keys at any point, making it impossible for the company to access encrypted content even if compelled. That also blocks law enforcement from demanding key retention or a pause on key rotation. Ring already offers full end-to-end encryption as an option, but it isn’t the default, and TAKE doesn’t change that.
Ring’s security reviews and future audit plans
Ring has pointed to internal testing as evidence of TAKE’s soundness, though independent verification remains limited so far. The company told EFF: “Ring conducts rigorous security reviews of all products before launch and critical components of TAKE’s infrastructure underwent independent security testing prior to launch. We are exploring options for further independent review.”
For now, that leaves outside observers relying largely on Ring’s own account of how the system behaves. The EFF’s position is that, short of fixing the underlying architecture, Ring should open the full infrastructure to third-party auditors so users don’t have to take the company’s claims on faith.
FAQ
What is Throw Away the Key Encryption (TAKE) and how does it work?
TAKE is a new encryption method for Ring cameras where encryption keys are temporarily held in Ring’s cloud for 24 hours to enable video features, then deleted.
Does TAKE provide full privacy like end-to-end encryption?
No, TAKE offers more privacy than Ring’s previous default encryption but does not prevent Ring from accessing decrypted footage temporarily, unlike true end-to-end encryption.
Can law enforcement access unencrypted Ring video footage under TAKE?
It remains technically possible for law enforcement to compel Ring to retain or provide encryption keys or unencrypted content due to the design of TAKE.
What security risks exist with key storage in TAKE?
Account recovery keys are stored on the camera device, which could be exploited if the camera is seized by an adversary or law enforcement.
Article produced with the assistance of artificial intelligence and reviewed by the editorial team.




